Rebuilding the Ruins

Rebuilding the Ruins

At a recent policy dialogue on security and inclusive development, experts tasked the Nigerian government to consider as immediate priority, the reconstruction of communities left in ruins by the Boko Haram insurgents. Chineme Okafor reports.

Nigeria has possibly lost more than it thought it could from its ongoing war against terrorism. Within the timeframe of four years that the Boko Haram insurgency has persisted, the country has lost its people and material resources to the rebellion.

There are good indications that Nigeria may have so far spent about N3.6 trillion trying to contain Boko Haram, in addition to scores of military and civilian lives lost to the group’s rebellious acts.

Apart from the monies and lives lost to the group, there are thousands of Nigerian citizens that have been kept on a lasting rove far away from their traditional homes by the insurgents.

Likewise, productive engagements majorly in agriculture and other human endeavours that sustain the economies of states in the north east where the war is rife have almost gone arid. Several farming seasons have passed with no one to till the ground and plant.

From the time when Boko Haram took up a full-fledged war against Nigeria in 2011, the country has in monetary terms expended huge funds that could have yielded more profits to her in terms of improved socio-economic development of the same north eastern states that are directly affected by the insurgency.

Indeed, development analysts reflect as waste, committing such huge funds to fight a war that some refer to as an expression of the poor socio-economic conditions of affected states vis-à-vis, an agitation rooted in the broken fabrics of the society.

However, Boko Haram in this regard appears to have contradicted such claims, the group from its operations lacks comes across as one with no coherent and realistic demand, and other than its acclaimed threat to Islamise and enthrone Sharia law across Nigeria. It has not made any known demand to indicate its agitation for an improved socio-economic status of the north east.

Drawing from the lessons learnt from the amnesty programme initiated for former militants in the Niger Delta by the federal government, a recent policy dialogue organised by Nextier Advisory, an interdisciplinary think-tank, attempted to explore sustainable solutions to the security challenges created by Boko Haram in the country.

Even though both issues appear dissimilar in context, the fact that they directly hit at the internal stability and security of Nigeria, made comparison of both crisis and suggestion for control quite absolute in the general perspective of their character-armed conflicts.

On hand to share the government’s experience in initiating and managing the amnesty programme at the policy discuss was Kingsley Kuku, Chairman, Presidential Amnesty Programme.

The submissions of Kuku at the discuss was complimented by the Principal Partner at Nextier Advisory, Patrick Okigbo and other analysts who posited that an evidence based investment in human development pointers would in no doubt prompt the kind of societal changes that will choke Boko Haram’s recruitment enterprise and thus guarantee security.

Speaking especially with regards to Nigeria’s current revenue shortfalls and subsequent financial austerity, the analysts at the policy discuss noted that if not cleverly managed, Nigeria may yet lose her capacity to sustain such high level of spending on the war against Boko Haram, given the competing demands for scarce resources by other priority sectors like health and education.

Prior to the times that Boko Haram effectively waged wars in Adamawa, Yobe and Bornu States, the north east region even with its unhealthy socio-economic indices, had promising economic fortunes in agriculture and allied industries.

It will be recalled that as at 2011 when the attacks became pronounced, statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) painted a picture of the socio-economic conditions of these states in the north east region averaging 68 and 28.5 per cent poverty and unemployment rates.

The harsh reality today in the states is that the economy of the region is almost going into the extinct with a large number of its productive citizens living far away from their homes as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

Halting this ugly trend from festering further requires not just a one-off, but a systemic approach and that exactly was the objective and expectation that the Nextier policy conversation attempted to achieve.

Intellectually engaging as planned, part of what was emphasised by analysts in the conversation was that if left unaddressed, the Boko Haram distress as presently constituted, can significantly affect quality of life in other parts of Nigeria, particularly with regards to the huge budgetary expenditure required to fight the war against deploying same to build sustainable social development systems.

Drawing from the realities that prosecuting the war against Boko Haram is an expensive venture, Okigbo in his opening remarks explained that the choice of the Presidential Amnesty Programme as a background for the discourse was guided by its reported success in solving the immediate challenges of militancy in the Niger Delta region.

He noted that like what Boko Haram is doing to the economy of the north east now, the militancy at its heydays significantly impacted economic and social activities in the Niger Delta region such that by 2009, Nigeria’s crude oil production had dropped from a high production volume of 2.6 million barrels per day (mbpd) to just about 0.7mbpd.

According to him, the amnesty programme could be referred to as a successful alternative to armed combat which did not work initially, adding that its stated goals of disarming all armed ex-agitators in the region, demobilising the camps, and engaging them in transformational training in non-violence agitation and then reintegrating the ex-agitators into the civil society seemed to have worked well.

The positive effects of the amnesty, Okigbo indicated are evident in reduced incidents of violent conflict, increased oil production back to about 2.5mbpd, restored business confidence in the Delta region, creation of multilayered jobs as well as upgrade in infrastructure development.

Okigbo examined the activities, successes, and challenges of the amnesty programme for possible lessons that can be applied to solve the challenges of Boko Haram, and noted that Nextier was mindful of the fact that the two conflicts have different social, economic, and political factors attached, nonetheless, he buttressed that the amnesty in totality initiated as a practical homegrown solution to a home-based problem, hence, the overriding incentive to seek similar homegrown solution to the Boko Haram challenge.

In seeking a home-grown solution to Boko Haram, Kuku in his review of the Niger Delta struggle pointed out that military action alone against the Niger Delta struggle did not give the government its expected results from the days of Isaac Boro through to Ken Saro Wiwa and then Asari Dokubo, before the emergence of multifarious leaders of the struggle.

He explained that certain astute and vital elements that led to the resolution of the Niger Delta conflicts could be pursued in the Boko Haram case but with specific procedures following the uniqueness of both conflicts.

For instance, he noted that identifying the real objective for the Boko Haram agitation, focal leaders of the agitation, genuine intra government and community commitment to address the agitation as well as the willingness of agitating parties to explore negotiation options for their agitation, are vital steps to overcoming such challenges.

To lend more credence to Kuku’s assertion that military actions alone do not guarantee lasting peace in troubled societies, a research conducted by public policy research organisation, RAND Corporation in 2008, stated that negotiated settlement have often worked in most cases of agitation.

The research had studied 268 terrorist groups that existed worldwide between 1968 and 2006 and found that 43 and 40 per cent of such groups ended because of a negotiated settlement or as a result of the operations carried out by local police or intelligence agencies.
The same research equally added that just about a paltry seven per cent of such agitations were defeated through military force while only 10 per cent of such groups achieved their objectives through the use of terror or force.

In the case of the Niger Delta struggle, both the government and the agitators realised that military action could not resolve the crisis, and they reasonably opted for negotiated settlement. But will Boko Haram agree to a negotiated settlement, going by its reported alienation?
Speaking on the idea of eliminating key leaders of a terrorist group in order to subsequently get at and annihilate the group, various thoughts at the policy meeting explained that it has always not played out well especially when terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and Hamas continue to exist irrespective of the death of their respective leaders and founders.

Kuku posited that similar theory did not succeed in the Niger Delta struggle, even with the death of Boro and Saro Wiwa and has not worked with Boko Haram with the alleged murder of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf.

Rather than suppress the Niger Delta agitation, the death of Saro Wiwa and Boro threw up Asari Dokubo, it further pulled the lid off the struggle to usher in extreme violence in the struggle when Dokubo was again arrested and incarcerated by the government, similarly, the alleged extra-judiciary killing of Boko Haram’s founder, Yusuf, has not repressed but rather fueled the Boko Haram struggle and led to the emergence of the more violent Abubakar Shekau with a devastating effects on the north east.

Indeed, there is also no proof that the elimination of Shekau will lead to the end of the terror group. New leaders may after all emerge to lead the movement, analysts posited at the conversation.

“Resolving agitations typically starts from within the struggle. The leadership of the community must get involved and declare that the agitation has reached a point where further violence makes no sense and will only further hurt the community.
The moderates in the struggle must convince the extremists that negotiated peace is possible and is the only feasible solution,” Kuku explained.
He added that the various parties and camps in the Niger Delta struggle met to agree on a single goal as contained in the ‘Kaiama Declaration’ which was signed in December 11, 1998, and further stated that establishing and understanding the core reasons for the agitation and what the groups seek to achieve would in this regard provide an added advantage to proposing and seeking a lasting solution.
The Kaiama declaration it was learnt, united the objectives of the struggles of the various groups in the Niger Delta and further defined in clear terms their grievances, objectives, and expectations, upon which a framework for successful negotiation with the government was built and achieved.

Going further to the collective role of the community, Kuku said that terrorism or armed conflict can hardly be managed where communities are indifferent or supportive of its propagators.

To this end, he stated that the communities involved must remain vocal on its stance and with committed actions, make efforts to pursue a peaceful resolution. Critical community leaders in north east, he ex[lained must tow the path that Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the Emir of Kano, had provided in the recent past with his call for a negotiated resolution of the agitation.

As regards government’s commitment to pull through a credible and far-reaching resolution to the Boko Haram challenges, a communique issued after the conversation stated that: “The government must demonstrate commitment to address the fundamental causes of the agitation. In the case of the Niger Delta, the then Vice President (and now President of Nigeria) Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, at the risk of kidnap, offered to visit the dreaded Camp 5 to negotiate with the leaders of the armed struggle.

This show of confidence and faith created the space for further negotiations that resulted in the creation of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme-a homegrown demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration programme. The government must find someone who is at the highest level of government to meet with and commence negotiations with credible leaders of Boko Haram.”
But getting Boko Haram to the negotiation table and eventually end the insurgency is not expected to be a tea party, Nextier recognises this and maintains that initiation of such credible solutions should start now.

“Nextier is mindful of the fact that no two conflicts are the same and that the elements of the solutions to the Niger Delta struggle cannot be transferred directly to address the Boko Haram challenge. However, there are some homegrown lessons that could be leveraged in creating the optimal solution to this current challenge.
This development discourse is the first in a series of policy meetings that will be organised by Nextier in our efforts to find a solution to the Boko Haram challenge. The key lessons from these sessions will be articulated in a policy brief that will be shared with the various government agencies charged with solving the Boko Haram problem. Our goal is to develop and document the most pragmatic solutions to this challenge and to provide them to the agencies charged with developing the solution,” Okigbo noted in the communiqué

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